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Sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling an action in order to influence 
one’s environment. It is widely accepted that various different sources of information 
contribute to sense of agency, including sensorimotor signals and external situational 
information. Moreover, it has been suggested that atypical experiences in sense of agency 
in schizophrenia are linked to changes in the relative influence of these agency cues, with 
external cues being more dominant. This study tests this hypothesis in a non-clinical 
population by investigating the relationship between schizotypy and performance on the 
vicarious agency task (a classic demonstration of the effect of external cues on sense of 
agency). We found that increased susceptibility to the vicarious agency illusion (i.e. an 
increased feeling of controlling someone else’s action) was linked to higher schizotypy 
scores. This supports the idea that aberrant experiences of agency in schizophrenia are 
linked to an increased sensitivity to external agency cues.  
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Sense of agency (SoAg) refers to the experience of initiating and controlling action in order 
to influence events in one’s environment. It is inextricably linked to everyday notions of 
freedom and responsibility (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009) and therefore forms an integral part 
of our cognitive and social lives (Moore & Fletcher, 2012). 
In the past years, two competing views that have been used to explain the neurocognitive 
origins of SoAg. Some have proposed that SoAg arises principally from internal processes 
serving motor control (Haggard, 2005) while others have placed more emphasis on external 
situational cues (Wegner, 2002, 2003). More recently, a consensus has grown that these 
mechanisms each contribute to an individual’s SoAg (Kranick & Hallett, 2013; Moore & 
Fletcher, 2012; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004; Wegner, 
Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). These cues include internal sensorimotor signals and external 
situational information (Moore & Fletcher, 2012). We have suggested that altered 
experiences of agency can be explained by differences in the relative influence of these 
agency cues (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Moore et al., 2009).  
Altered experiences of agency are associated with numerous psychiatric and neurological 
disorders. Some of the clearest examples of this are delusions of control reported by some 
patients with schizophrenia. Symptoms of schizophrenia can be classified into ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ symptoms. Positive symptoms are characterised by the presence of perceptions 
(e.g. visual hallucinations) or delusional beliefs. Negative symptoms consist in the absence, 
or reduction, of adaptive functions such as emotional understanding, speech or abstract 
thinking (Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987). Within the positive symptoms category are included 
abnormal experiences of agency. Patients with schizophrenia may feel that they are not in 
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control of their own actions. Instead they feel as though another agent or force is causing 
them to move. Mellor (1970) provides an example of this, presenting the words of a patient 
describing their experience: ‘It is my hand and arm that move, and my fingers pick up the 
pen, but I don’t control them. What they do is nothing to do with me.’  Interestingly, while 
patients with schizophrenia have reported a lack of agency towards their actions, various 
experimental studies show that these patients tend to show an exaggerated sense of 
agency, that is an over-attribution of agency to themselves (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et 
al., 2001; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010). 
In previous experimental and theoretical work, we have suggested that these disordered 
experiences of control are linked to specific agency-processing changes (Voss et al., 2010). 
Voss and colleagues (2010) showed that in patients with schizophrenia the contribution of 
internal sensorimotor cues to sense of agency is reduced, while the contribution of external 
cues is increased. We have argued that these agency-processing changes can be explained 
by an optimal cue integration model of SoAg, in which the dominance of individual agency 
cues is linked to their reliability (Moore & Fletcher, 2012). In this way, owing to unreliable 
sensorimotor cues in schizophrenia there is a greater reliance on external cues.  
 
In the present study we offer a further test of this hypothesis by exploring how schizotypy in 
a healthy population relates to their performance on the so-called ‘Vicarious agency’ 
paradigm (Wegner et al., 2004). The vicarious agency paradigm provides a classic 
demonstration of the effects of external cues on agency processing. In this paradigm 
participants sit facing a mirror with an experimental assistant standing behind them, hidden 
from view by a curtain. The assistant puts their hand forward in such a way that they look 
like the participant’s hands (see Figure 1 for the paradigm’s set-up). While looking towards 
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the mirror, participants also listen to action instructions through a pair of headphones. 
These action instructions are either a match or a mismatch with the actions the assistant 
was making. Wegner et al. found that participants felt an increased sense of control over 
the actions performed by the experimenter when there was congruency between the 
instructions and the actions performed by the assistant. This paradigm demonstrates how 
external situational agency cues, in this case action instructions and movements made by 
the experimenter, can have an influence on the SoAg. The influence of these external 
agency cues is so strong that participants can feel a SoAg over movements that they have 
not performed, despite them not having any related internal sensorimotor cues.   
Importantly, the manipulation of the participants sense of ownership towards the 
experimenter’s arms, which is achieved by placing the experimenter’s hands in a body 
congruent position so as they look like the participant’s own hands, is essential to this 
paradigm’s ability to elicit the experience of vicarious agency. Theoretical accounts of 
agency have argued that the positive experience of agency is predicated on the feeling that 
the body part that is moving is one’s own (Gallagher, 2000). Furthermore, a large number of 
experimental studies have demonstrated how ownership manipulation alters the sense of 
agency  (Pyasik, Furlanetto, & Pia, 2019 for a review), suggesting that these two 
components of self-awareness are, at least partially, related.  
In the present experiment we examined the relationship between performance on the 
vicarious agency paradigm and schizotypy. It has been suggested that for non-clinical 
populations, psychotic experiences can occur with differing degrees (Van Os, Linscott, 
Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009). Investigating the schizotypy personality in a non clinical 
population provides a good opportunity to explore the cognitive and biological mechanisms 
that may be associated with schizophrenia, without the confounding effects associated with 
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a clinical population, such as medications, hospitalisation and severe symptoms (Asai, 2016; 
Raine, Lencz, & Benishay, 1995). Similarly to how previous studies have shown a link 
between altered sense of agency and body ownership in patients with schizophrenia 
(Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001; Peled, Ritsner, Hirschmann, Geva, & Modai, 2000; 
Synofzik et al., 2010), studies in the general population have found that people who are 
highly schizotypal showed an altered sense of agency and ownership (Asai, Mao, Sugimori, 
& Tanno, 2011; Asai & Tanno, 2007). 
 
In light of the relationship between schizotypy and schizophrenia, we expected that changes 
in the experience of control on the vicarious agency task will be uniquely predictive of 
schizotypy (separate measures of anticipation and ownership during this task should show 
no relationship with schizotypy). More specifically, we expect that the difference in the 
experience of control on match and mismatch trials will be greater in participants that show 
higher scores on our schizotypy measures, as a consequence of a greater reliance on 
external agency cues.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
For this experiment, 53 participants took part in exchange for course credit, of which 7 were 
males, all aged between 17 and 35 years and mean age of 20 years. The participants were 
included if their vision was normal or corrected-to-normal and they had no history of mental 





Vicarious agency task 
All participants began by performing the vicarious agency task. The experimental procedure 
was modified from Wegner et al. (2004), and the same as in Cioffi et al. (2016; 2017). 
Participants sat facing a mirror placed one meter away. Action previews were played to the 
participant using over-ear headphones. We used a cloth sheet to fully cover the 
participant’s body below the neck. The participant put on a pair of white gloves and their 
arms were hidden from view below the sheet. An experimenter stood behind the 
participant, hidden by a curtain with two armholes for the experimenter. The experimenter 
also wore headphones in order to be able to listen to the instructions heard by the 
participant. The experimenter wore a blouse along with a pair of gloves such that there was 
no exposed skin and the parts visible to the participant were the same colour as both the 
sheet and gloves worn by the participant. The experimenter positioned their left or right 
arm forward such that it appeared where the participant’s own arm would have been, were 
it to be above the sheet covering the participant’s body. During the experiment, the 
participants were asked to remain still and look at the reflection in the mirror in front of 





Figure 1. Left: side view of the experimental setup. Right: participant’s view of the 
experimental setup. Note that the arm and fist in picture belong to the experimenter that is 
sitting behind the participant, hidden by the curtain. This picture is taken from Cioffi et al. 
(2016). 
Sixteen instructions for unimanual actions were played through the headphones (e.g., “raise 
your hand,” “point at the mirror”, “point at yourself with the thumb”). The experimenter 
performed the gesture immediately after each action instruction played. Each trial, lasting 
between eight and ten seconds, consisted of one action instruction plus a gesture. A three 
second break was given between trials to prevent carryover effects. In order to increase the 
effects of this manipulation, the 16 instruction-action trials were repeated 3 times in the 
same order without interruption. This was performed for each condition (match/mismatch; 
see below) and for each hand (left/right).  
 
Importantly, while the list of instructions played was the same for both match and mismatch 
conditions, the congruency of the action performed by the experimenter was manipulated. 
In the match condition, the action performed by the experimenter corresponded to the 
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instruction heard by the participant over the headphones. Instead, in the mismatch 
condition, each action instruction was randomly paired with another action. For example, 
after the instruction “point to the mirror” the experimenter waved their hand. For the 
mismatch condition, the gesture paired with the instruction was changed for each 
repetition. For example, for the second repetition of the instruction “point to the mirror”, 
the experimenter snapped their fingers. The match and mismatch conditions were 
completed for both the left and right hands, resulting in a total of four conditions (match 
right, match left, mismatch right, mismatch left). The order in which these four conditions 
were tested was counterbalanced across participants.  
 
Following each condition, the participants were asked to rate three aspects of their 
experiences on a seven-point Likert scale, based on questions presented in Wegner et al.’s 
(2004) study, and identical to the ones used in Cioffi (2016, 2017). The ratings were 
collected after each condition, and for each hand, with the lowest value, 1, being ‘not at all’ 
and the highest value, 7, being ‘very much’. In total, four sets of ratings were collected for 
each participant. Participants were asked to answer the following three questions:    
 
1- ‘’To what degree did you feel you could anticipate the movements of the arm?”  
This question served as check question, as it aimed to assess whether the stimuli 
were overall attended to. This was included to rule out that any potential 
performance differences could be ascribed to a failure in attending the primes. If 
most primes were attended to then the anticipation judgements should be higher in 




2- ‘’How much control did you feel you had over the arm’s movements?” 
This question assessed the sense of control experienced by the participants. 
 
3- ‘’To what degree did the arm feel like it belonged to you?’’  
This question assessed the sense of ownership experience by the participants.  
 
Each participant went through a practice session at the start of the experiment. The practice 
session consisted of three match and three mismatch trials. 
Previous studies using this paradigm showed how the congruency between action and 
instruction elicits a vicarious experience of agency towards the experimenter’s movements 
(Wegner et al., 2004; Cioffi et al., 2016). Therefore, we expect participants to report higher 
control ratings following the match conditions compared to the mismatch conditions.  
 
Schizotypy scales 
Following the vicarious agency task, participants were asked to fill in two schizotypy scales.  
The Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI: Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004) is designed to 
measure delusional ideation in the normal population (e.g. “Do your thoughts ever feel alien 
to you in some way?”). It contains 21 items, and when an item is recognised by the 
participant then they are asked to complete three 5-point scales exploring distress, 
preoccupation, and conviction. The Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS: Bell, 
Halligan, & Ellis, 2006) aims to measure unusual perceptual experiences in non-clinical 
population (e.g. “Do you ever see things that other people cannot?”). The scale contains 32 
items, when an item is recognised by the participant, they are asked to complete three 5-
point scales exploring distress, intrusiveness, and frequency. Previous studies have 
11 
 
demonstrated the validity and reliability of both scales (Peters et al., 2004; Bell, Halligan, & 
Ellis, 2006). 
Higher scores on these scales place an individual closer to the psychopathological end of the 





Vicarious agency task 
A preliminary analysis on left and right hands was carried out for each condition using a 
paired sample test to see if their results could be distinguished. As no significant differences 
emerged, the mean judgements for left and right hands were collapsed into a single score 
(for example: (Anticipation match condition Left hand + Anticipation match condition Right 
hand)/2). These were entered into a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with one factor 
being Congruence (Match/Mismatch) and one factor being Judgement type 
(Anticipation/Control/Ownership).  
We replicated the vicarious agency effect (see Figure 2). There was a significant main effect 
of Congruence; the average anticipation, control and ownership judgements were higher in 
the match vs. mismatch conditions (F (1,52) = 131.99, p < .001, η2partial = .72). There was also 
a main effect of Judgement type: the overall levels of anticipation were higher than control 
or ownership (F (2,104) = 39.79, p < .01, η2partial = .44). Finally, there was a significant 
interaction between Congruence and Judgement type (F (2,104) = 46.16, p < .001, η2partial = 









The two schizotypy scales (CAPS and PDI) are scored in the same way. Participants answer 
“yes” or “no” for each item. If they answer “yes”, they then provide ratings on three 
additional 5-point sales. To calculate total PDI and CAPS scores, the number of “yes” 
responses is added to the sum of all additional ratings on the 5-point scales. Summary 
statistics for total scores and sub-scale scores are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Mean scores on the 21 Item Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI) and Cardiff Anomalous 
Perceptions Scale (CAPS). Standard deviation of the mean is reported in parentheses. 
 Mean (SD) 
PDI  
Total   53.6 (38.0) 
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Distress 16.6 (13.0) 
Preoccupation      16.1 (12.7) 
Conviction 16.9 (12.8) 
CAPS  
Total 64.4 (48.0) 
Distress 19.0 (15.2) 
Distraction 20.1 (15.3) 
Occurrence 16.8 (14.3) 
 
 
Relationship between vicarious agency and schizotypy 
Our key hypothesis concerned the relationship between the vicarious agency effect and 
schizotypy. In particular, we predicted that the stronger this effect, the higher the 
schizotypy score.  This would be consistent with the theory that agency processing in 
schizophrenia is biased towards external agency cues. To test this, we ran two separate 
hierarchical linear regression analyses for the CAPS and PDI respectively. The predictor 
variables were differences in mean judgements (match – mismatch) for control, anticipation 
and ownership experiences respectively (see Table 2 for a matrix of simple correlations 
between all variables). Based on our initial hypothesis that individual differences in the 
feeling of control would predict schizotypy scores, ‘control’ was entered into the model first 
followed by the anticipation and ownership judgements. These were entered into the linear 
regression model simultaneously. Table 3 presents the results for both CAPS and PDI. 
Control was a significant predictor of CAPS total scores. This relationship is plotted in Figure 
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3.  No other judgement types were predictive of CAPS. For the PDI no judgement types were 
significant predictors of PDI total scores. These results show that control did predict 





Table 2. Matrix of Pearson’s correlations (r). 
 ‘Control’ ‘Ownership’  ‘Anticipation’  PDI CAPS 
‘Control’ —***          
‘Ownership’ 0.59*** —***        
‘Anticipation’ 0.20***                0.21 *** —***    
PDI 0.24***  0.05 *** 0.06*** —***  
CAPS  0.31***  0.09 *** 0.14*** 0.57***   —***    
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
 
Table 3. Output for separate hierarchical linear regression analyses assessing the 
relationship between CAPS and PDI total scores (dependent variables) and mean judgement 
differences (match – mismatch) for the three judgement types (predictors). 
 Beta Standard error of beta Standardised beta 
CAPS    
Step 1    
Constant 52.16 8.30  
‘Control’ 9.03 3.95 .31* 
Step 2    
Constant 46.07 13.75  
‘Control’ 11.19 4.96 .38* 
‘Anticipation’ 2.34 3.38 .10 
‘Ownership’ -4.57 4.97 -.16 
PDI    
Step 1    
Constant 46.06 6.71  
‘Control’ 5.54 3.19 .24 
Step 2    
Constant 45.74 11.17  
‘Control’ 7.47 4.03 .32 
‘Anticipation’ .45 2.74 .02 
‘Ownership’ -3.43 4.03 -.15 
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Note: CAPS: R2 = .09 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .02 for Step 2 / PDI: R2 = .06 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .01 for 
Step 2.    * < 0.05    
 
Figure 3. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between CAPS total scores and mean control 
judgement differences (match – mismatch). 
 
Discussion 
We investigated the relationship between the experience of vicarious agency and 
schizotypy. First, we replicated the basic vicarious agency effect reported by Wegner et al. 
(2004). That is, people experienced more control over movements made by someone else 
when the action instruction matched with the gesture performed. Second, we showed that 
individual differences in the experience of vicarious agency on this task predicted CAPS 
scores. These findings partially support our initial hypothesis that the experience of control 




Recent theoretical accounts of sense of agency (e.g. Moore & Fletcher, 2012) have 
emphasised the contribution of various agency cues, both internal (i.e. sensorimotor) and 
external (i.e. situational). In replicating the vicarious agency effect, we have confirmed the 
influence of external situational cues on sense of agency. This effect shows that in the 
absence of internal sensorimotor signals, external cues exert a stronger influence on sense 
of agency. This finding also supports the suggestion that the relative influence of agency 
cues is dependent on their reliability. That is, these agency cues are optimally integrated 
(Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012).   
 
Previously we have suggested that this principle of optimal cue integration can been used to 
explain aberrant experiences of agency in certain clinical and neurological disorders. For 
example, the experience of agency in individuals with schizophrenia seems to be dominated 
by external cues to agency (e.g. Voss et al., 2010) and this, in turn, may be linked to 
unreliable sensorimotor prediction also observed in these patients. A strong prediction from 
this recent agency processing research in schizophrenia is that individuals with 
schizophrenia should be more susceptible to manipulations of external agency cues. Here 
we carried out a test of this in a group of healthy individuals by assessing the relationship 
between schizotypy and performance in Wegner’s vicarious agency task. Our results provide 
support for this prediction: individual differences in the susceptibility to this agency illusion 
predicted schizotypy scores. This finding adds further weight to the idea that agency 
processing in patients with schizophrenia is more heavily influenced by external agency 
signals. It is worth underlining that our study focused on investigating the relationship 
between agency and the positive dimension of schizotypy. This was motivated by an 
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extensive literature showing this relationship in patients with schizophrenia (e.g. Daprati et 
al., 1997; Voss et al., 2010). In light of this we did not consider relationships between 
vicarious agency experiences and the negative or disorganised dimensions of schizotypy. 
Moreover, our check question ‘anticipation’ which was asked at the end of each condition 
as a marker of attention to the primes-outcome relationship, cannot guarantee that 
participants attended to all the trials equally. This would be particularly relevant when 
testing a clinical population whose level of attention may tend to fluctuate more. These are 
certainly limitations of this study, and they should be considered in future work looking at 
the relationship between agency and schizotypy. 
 
To flesh out the clinical significance of this finding, future work should attempt to replicate 
this effect in a group of individuals with schizophrenia. Here it will be important to try to 
understand how this putative agency processing abnormality can explain the specific 
symptoms reported by patients. For example, how can this agency processing abnormality 
explain the occurrence and the content of passivity symptoms? Linked to this it will also be 
important to examine the relationship between this behavioural effect and delusional vs. 
hallucinatory symptoms. Our findings suggest that agentive vulnerability, at least in the 
context of this task, may be associated more strongly with hallucinatory symptoms - we only 
found a significant relationship with CAPS scores. This is an intriguing finding given that 
aberrant experiences of agency are typically classed as delusions. One possible explanation 
for this finding is that the vicarious agency task has a very strong perceptual component: 
both auditory and perceptual cues have to be processed in order for the vicarious agency 
illusion to emerge. Moreover, internal sensorimotor information is absent as the participant 
remains passive throughout the experiment. Given the perceptual demands of the task it 
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may not be surprising that behaviour on the task is predictive of perceptual aberrations as 
measured by CAPS.  
 
One possible methodological issue should be noted. All participants completed the 
schizotypy scales at the end of the testing session. It is therefore possible, that the vicarious 
agency task influenced responses to items on these scales, potentially making it more likely 
that participants would endorse anomalous experiences. However, we feel that this feature 
of our methodology is unlikely to have unduly influenced our data and results. First, it looks 
like the mean CAPS and PDI scores were comparable to previous studies. Second, even if it 
did encourage the endorsement of CAPS statements, one would likely assume a similar shift 
across participants. Third, our key finding concerns the link between variability in vicarious 
agency and variability in schizotypy responses, which if there is a general shift in responses 
on the questionnaires, is unlikely to negate that result. 
 
In summary we have shown that external situational cues can exert a powerful influence on 
the sense of agency. Moreover, we have shown that the magnitude of this effect is linked to 
schizotypy, with a stronger influence of external cues being predictive of higher schizotypy 
scores in a healthy adult population. This is consistent with the idea that agency processing 
in schizophrenia is characterised by an increased reliance external cues. Future work should 
aim to shed further light on this agency processing abnormality and its link with specific 
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